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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of main problems affecting the development of North Korean regions. It 
recognizes the importance of transport and logistics as key factors in regional economic growth. A critical 
overview of main economic areas in terms of market size, industrial specializations, accessibility, and 
infrastructure provision, concludes that Nampo is the most efficient location for European companies that 
are willing to use North Korea as a base for producing and exporting their goods. Conclusions are based 
on recent figures about maritime traffics and hinterland characteristics.  
Keywords: DPRK, Europe, Logistics, North Korea, Regional Development 
 2 
Introduction 
Several studies have addressed the different characteristics of North Korea‟s main 
economic areas. However, their results have remained mostly speculative and somewhat 
contradicting, due to data shortage. Therefore, most research depends on broad 
qualitative appreciations and external estimations of North Korea‟s regional economic 
performance. Very few works have provided a quantitative regional geography of the 
country. As for example, Jo and Adler (2002) show the difficulty providing accurate 
population figures by city and province, but they success in demonstrating key 
processes of a socialist developing country. They particularly highlight the precedence 
taken by economic factors over ideological factors, resulting in the formation of 
Pyongyang primate city, and the deficiency of intra and inter regional balance. One 
main explanation is that centralized socialist planning finds difficult to sustain its 
legitimacy and efficiency in a globalized environment where economic factors become 
dominant. Another set of studies based on international trading vessel movements 
demonstrated the gradual concentration of the North Korean port system favouring 
Nampo, the gateway to Pyongyang (Jo and Ducruet, 2006; Ducruet and Jo, 2007). Thus, 
both urban and port systems illustrate major spatial changes within the country, such as 
the “shift to the West” of populations and activities during the last two decades, as a 
result of geopolitical change, uneven accessibility, and overall industrial collapse 
(Roussin and Ducruet, 2006; Ducruet and Roussin, 2007a).  
 
In order to address whether North Korean economic areas are differently attractive to 
foreign firms such as European firms, an overview of their main characteristics is 
provided in the first section. It is believed that European firms have a comparative 
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advantage over other firms stemming from the absence of political issues between 
North Korea and Europe (Bridges, 2003). Besides, they can be seen as any potential 
investor for which location factors are the same than for other companies, in terms of 
market opportunities and logistics efficiency. Thus, this first section reviews the 
different economic areas according to their compatibility with global standards of 
supply chain management. In a second section and from this economic and logistics 
approach, the most relevant area, Nampo-Pyongyang, is selected and analyzed in terms 
of land-sea capacity, recent European investments and potential growth. 
 
1. Regional panorama of North Korean logistics 
1.1 Performance indicators of main economic areas 
 
One major constraint to addressing the actual state of industrial activities in different 
parts of North Korea is the fact that only 20% of existing industries are still in operation 
or in semi-operation. The Soviet model based on heavy industry, the dramatic shortages 
of energy since the early 1990s, and the increase of defence-related expenditures at a 
time of diplomatic tensions and trade isolation all have provoked severe wounds to the 
whole economic system. As a consequence, any estimation of economic performance 
should not ignore that except Pyongyang and Nampo, most other cities have seen their 
economic base vanish over time. Cheongjin, a main economic centre of 800,000 
inhabitants located in the northeast, has been described by a former UN representative 
as a „forest of scrap metal‟ where the port is rather dormant (Pons, 2006).  
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The table 1 illustrates the actual and potential inventory of industries in DPRK by main 
areas. It shows that North Korea offers to investors an interesting mix of various natural 
resources highly demanded on the world market as uranium, copper or nickel, and an 
industrial tradition, the north part of Korean peninsula being industrialized since the 
1920‟s. On the manufacturing heritage some new sectors have been introducing during 
this last decade like tourism or glass. By extension and based on the project 
announcements and various visits of foreign firms in DPRK since the warming between 
both Korea in 2000, we can extrapolate which possible industries could be located in the 
main North Korean industrial areas; Nampo-Pyongyang and Wonsan-Hamheung 
seemed to have the best and largest potential.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Therefore, any interpretation of Table 1 should be cautious, as most traditional 
industries collapse and few new industries have been developed in the recent years. 
Economic specializations of the different areas may not be regarded as crucial for new 
developments. In fact, foreign firms shall invest in North Korea whatever the mere 
traces of past local knowledge and skills. Those are not consistent enough to be 
considered as valid economic rents (Kaplinski, 2004). Moreover, the two examples of 
Gaeseong Industrial Park (GIC) and Rajin-Seonbong show that new developments have 
been taking place without any linkages with formerly existing industries. On the one 
hand, the South Korean government-based GIC continues to prosper since its start in 
2004, even during peak diplomatic tension periods, such as summer 2006 nuclear tests. 
At the end of 2006, ten thousand North Korean workers were operating in fifteen South 
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Korean companies and plans to expand the site are currently examined. On the other 
hand, Rajin-Seonbong has not prospered due to mismanagement (Ducruet, 2008a). 
Developers of the zone have selected high-tech industries, casino, and retail instead of 
using the port as both a catalyst for economies of scale in manufacturing and a remedy 
to geographical remoteness. Traffic data show that Rajin port has been used intensively 
for carrying construction materials to build the zone at early developmental stage rather 
than for trade activities (Jo and Ducruet, 2007). This is being partly recovered as China 
is willing to improve the connection between Rajin and Jilin province through highway 
development and the installation of a logistics-free zone at Namyang (Hankyoreh, 2006). 
China‟s ambition using Rajin as a gateway to the Pacific is somehow counterbalanced 
by Russia‟s strategy to provide the zone with energy in exchange of connecting Rajin to 
Siberia‟s oil and gas fields through pipeline and railways (American Shipper, 2008), 
what confirms the ambivalent position of North Korea towards China and Russia. 
Despite its more favourable location at the border with China, where approximately 50 
to 80 percent of North Korean exports pass, Sinuiju Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) has not much developed since the appointed manager Yang Bin has been arrested 
by Chinese authorities after the project has just been launched in 2002. Another reason 
in the failure of this zone and exposed by DPRK authorities, was the absence of free 
trade agreement for SAR with China, which completely minimized the competitively of 
Sinuiju. Although a Special Zone at Nampo area is mentioned by the South Korean 
Ministry of Unification (2005), there is not yet evidence of its realization. However, the 
example of Nampo shows that a special economic zone is not mandatory for economic 
development, as 120 Chinese firms have invested in the province in the recent years 
(Pons, 2004). Nampo and Wonsan are strategic locations and for this reason they have 
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not been opened officially to free trade. Recent announcements about the free zone 
project on Bidan and Wihwa islands at the Chinese border near Sinuiju confirm the 
preference to peripheral locations remote from Pyongyang (Yonhap News, 2007), and 
more specifically the wish of the authorities to keep Chinese firms, as much as possible, 
far from the country‟s heart and less visible for the local population.  
 
Previous attempts to estimate the performance of main economic areas are synthesized 
in Table 2. Based on the hypothesis of further foreign investment, coastal locations are 
pointed by Kim (2000) as the most promising areas to matching the Chinese model of 
Open Cities. The author identifies five desirable factors for motivating investment for 
South Korean firms:  
- coastal city area: economic advantages of water transport 
- pre-existing industrial base: experienced workforce despite damaged facilities 
- safe investment: areas far from sensitive sites such as military bases 
- economic linkages with neighbouring countries: proximity to borders 
- personnel attractiveness: educational facilities, skilled labour 
 
According to this framework, factor such as remoteness from military sites does not 
apply to Gaeseong, a fruitful project near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Also, the 
proximity to borders or ports, under the control of the Army, has proved wrong for 
Sinuiju SAR and Rajin-Seonbong FTZ. Of course, it is partly due to the elaboration of 
this framework prior to the reforms and special zones that take place from 2002. 
However, it implies that any rigidly objective analysis of North Korean economic areas 
is not sufficient to understand the current situation. There is more a complex mingling 
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of different factors with a large share of unexpectedness. As indicated above, usual 
arguments explaining the demise of Rajin-Seonbong FTZ through geographical 
remoteness and lack of economic base have largely ignored the importance of ports and 
the fact that high-tech industries are not likely to grow without a previous 
developmental stage in the manufacturing / exporting industries sector. Even Silicon 
Valley in the US has not grown up from nothing but has benefited from already existing 
military sites where research activities became attractive for regional innovation 
(Howells, 2005). Thus, any attempt to rationalize investment factors in North Korea 
based on objective benchmarking remains very limited. There are no inherent qualities 
of places that turn them into economic centres „naturally‟, but a set of ongoing 
processes and strategies varying through space and time.  
 
In order to benchmark the different economic areas, a synthesis of Kim (2000) and Lee 
(2001) is proposed in Table 2 based on the given scores. As a result, the skilled, 
abundant, and cheap labour is one of the most important factors to attract investments, 
and constitutes a very strong advantage of North Korea over other developing Asian 
countries and notably China (Chabaud-Latour, 2006). Among the different zones, 
Pyongyang-Nampo is seen as the most promising investment area, as it is well 
represented in all factors, except raw material provision but this factor stands among the 
less important elsewhere. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Based on such estimations of economic performance, what could be the prime location 
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for European firms willing to invest in North Korea? It seems that besides 
considerations on existing industries, markets, and development potentials, one main 
factor that is usually neglected by scholars is the ability of a place to provide efficient 
logistics. Therefore, a complementary analysis is necessary is order to further estimate 
how the different economic areas may be attractive for European firms in their global 
strategy of being inserted in supply chains and realize an export-based activity.  
 
1.2 The diversity of logistics‟ efficiency 
 
The overall characteristics of the North Korean transport system are very influenced by 
the Soviet model, with a major importance given to land transport (Table 3). This is 
explained by specialization in heavy industries, agriculture, and mining, of which the 
products take the largest share (80%) compared to manufactured goods (Tsuji, 2005). 
The predominant heavy loads have tended to damage the roads to such extent that 
without regular management, and in addition to very contrasted natural conditions, 
about 7% only of the entire road network is paved (Bang, 2004). Without sufficient coal 
due to the impossibility to restart flooded-mines due to lack of oil, some steam trains 
dating back to Japanese occupation even use old truck or car tires to fuel the locomotive. 
Also, short distance goods carriage is ensured by agricultural vehicles, of which animal-
led, and also by hands. On the maritime side, no modern container-handling facilities 
are said to exist in North Korea, but at least containers are regularly handled in Nampo 
and Rajin ports (Ducruet and Roussin, 2007b), given the announcements in the press 
about new terminal facilities financed by (or leased to) China (Lloyd‟s Register, 2006). 
However, not only North Korean ports have not been much modernized since several 
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decades, but also the army – which controls the ports – collects very high entrance fees, 
resulting in excessive shipping costs and prolonged shipping time (Ahn, 2002). For 
example, one TEU
1
 carried between Incheon, South Korea, and Nampo costs US$1,000, 
i.e. as much as a journey to Europe, and takes 24 hours for a round trip of only 100 
kilometres (Ahn, 2001). However, since the signature of the inter-Korean agreement 
(2004), the two ports have launched joint regular shuttle services (Lloyd‟s Register, 
2005), and the cost as dropped to US$250, allowing more traffics (Choe et al., 2005).  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Another important aspect of the transport system is its very heterogeneous geographical 
coverage (Figure 1). Centred upon Pyongyang, the highway network is mostly 
reflecting militarist and political needs to circulate efficiently along main East-West and 
North-South axis. In turn, the core region remains protected from borders as it does not 
connect directly to other neighbours‟ highways. Moreover, the conditions of the 
highways are very unequal. If the highways connecting Pyongyang to Nampo, 
Gaeseong and North of South Pyongan Province are in quite good state, the highway to 
join Wonsan is in poor condition due to long, dark and dangerous tunnels along its way, 
where accidents are frequent between the trucks and other vehicles and pedestrians.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Although it appears very well developed, the railway network is in fact poorly efficient, 
                                            
1
 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit, standard measure of container traffics 
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given the fact that it is approximately 70% electrified (CIA, 2005), and that the country 
runs out of energy. It has been observed that more generally, electricity spreads from 
Pyongyang to other provinces through a weekly rotation and in small quantities to 
minimize shortcuts. This gives a much contrasted regional distribution of domestic 
transport activities, with 30% around Nampo-Pyongyang, 10% around Sinuiju, 24% 
between Cheongjin and Rajin-Seonbong, and 17% around Hamheung-Heungnam (Tsuji, 
2005). In terms of domestic circulation, there is an increasing separation between East, 
where several truck accidents are reported due to travel time, delays, lack of gas stations, 
repair facilities, and dangerous conditions notably along the coast and in the mountains; 
and West, where most of the operating factories are located. For foreign players, 
implications are enormous, as companies in North Korea have to spend 40% of their 
manufacturing costs on logistics (Foster-Carter, 2001).  
 
As a result, foreign companies who want to invest in DPRK must be very careful 
regarding the location of their investments in order to not loss competitive advantage of 
the low-cost manpower in logistic cost. Thus, it appears at the term of this section that 
Nampo-Pyongyang area in the actual condition offer the best logistic solution for 
European firms, which will mainly use their facilities in North Korea for exportations to 
other most-advanced Asian countries or Europe. In the next section, we propose to 
analyze more specifically this area, the Nampo-Pyongyang Corridor (NPC).  
 
2. The case of the Nampo-Pyongyang corridor 
2.1 Recent developments around the corridor area 
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The Nampo-Pyongyang Corridor (NPC) is a plain with some smooth ills delimited by 
the administrative limits of Pyongyang‟s province and the agglomeration of Nampo 
(South Pyongan Province), both cities being only separated of 50 km or 1 hour of 
driving. With a population of 4.35 millions residents (around 1,500 residents per km², 
respectively 3,900,000 residents for Pyongyang area and 450,000 for Nampo), 18.5 % 
of national population, the NPC is the largest human concentration in DPRK and offers 
to foreign investors an abundant and cheap manpower. The monthly wage of a worker 
employed in a foreign company on Pyongyang is around 50 EUR (taxes included) and a 
specialist or a manager could be hired for 100 EUR per month, the NPC‟s area being the 
best place in DPRK to find skilled employees due to the location of the key national 
universities (Kim Chaek University of Technology, Kim Il-Sung University, the 
University of the Foreign Studies or the Pyongyang University of Science and 
Technology). 
 
Beside this human factor, the NPC is also quite well connected with the other provinces 
(highways in good state to join Gaeseong and the north of South Pyongan Province, 
highway in more critical condition to go to Wonsan, railroads to reach the entire 
country) and most important for an European firm, NPC is connect to overseas through 
the port of Nampo for the goods, which is linked by regular service to Dalian port, and 
the airport of Pyongyang (Sunan international airport) for the sensitive goods and the 
expatriates, with regular passengers and cargos flies to Beijing.  
 
If the air road service does not show any specific problem except the age of the vessels, 
port service in Nampo faces two main difficulties. First, the access to Nampo port is 
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limited by the West Sea barrage which allows only ships under 50,000 DWT
2
 to enter, 
one time a day. Second difficulty, due to the trend of the containers to disappear in 
DPRK where they are easily recycling to other uses (storages, offices…), shipping 
companies ask now that the containers are loaded on board within the 24 hours after the 
arrival of the vessel. As a result, in order to minimize the transportation cost and to 
avoid buying its own containers, the port location is more advantageous. However, we 
can estimate that Nampo port in general is improving its services, but the city remains 
in very bad conditions, far from Pyongyang‟s environment. A new container terminal 
has been recently built there (Lloyd‟s Register, 2006), probably in order to sustain the 
trend of growth in container traffics (Figure 2).  
 
Also, total traffic has been relatively stable along the last 20 years, except following the 
USSR‟s collapse (1991-1996). Between 1997 and 2001, the growth is mostly based on 
aid imports, while the growth from 2002 is more based on trade. This last trend is both 
explained by recent investments in the NPC and the betterment of inter-Korean 
relationships since 2000, reflected in their maritime agreement of 2005 (Ducruet and 
Roussin, 2007c). Notably, the cost of carrying one container on the Incheon-Nampo 
route has reduced fourfold after the agreement, as it is a main artery carrying 90% of 
inter-Korean sea trade.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
As we can see on figure 3, the NPC has been relatively well developed by the 
                                            
2
 Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) represents the volume of the ship used for the carriage of goods 
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authorities during these last decades. A 6 lines road of 46 km follows the river Daedong 
and a large 10 lines highway of 44 km has been constructed later in 2000 lining more 
quickly Pyongyang and its port. Railways network is also widely extended with a main 
line between the both cities and several branches joining key industrials complexes; this 
area being one‟s of the main industrial district of DPRK with 2 mines, and 5 complexes 
specialized in mechanic and heavy industries, mostly still in operations.  
 
Another important element in this area is the comparatively less lack of energy hitting it. 
Indeed, due to its political and economical key position, the NPC is privileged compare 
to other provinces and does not suffer of one-day-a-week shortcut. Factories located 
there can expect a better energy supply than in the entire country. In the same way and 
because of the same factors, diesel oil and gasoline are easier to find into NPC‟s area. 
As a matter of fact, Pyongyang and its nearby areas represented 50 % of the gasoline 
national consumption and 70 % of diesel consumption (Source: internal report).    
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
As a result, most recent and main investments in DPRK (outside of mining sector) have 
been located on the NPC. Among them we can quote the Daean Friendship Glass 
Factory opened in 2006 in cooperation with the Chinese authorities. Equipments have 
been supplied by China, DPRK‟s army has built the facilities before to transfer it to the 
Cabinet (in DPRK, main factorises are under the control of the cabinet and smaller ones 
under the control of municipalities). To pay back this investment of US$24 million, 
DPRK has to buy raw material and energy from China. Following the same model, two 
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other news factories have been inaugurated recently: a ceramics plant (with Italian 
origin equipments) and a synthetic painting industrial unit on Kiyang, near the 
Kumsong Tractor Complex. Also, the recent strategy of the Egyptian firm Orascom 
(cement) using Nampo as an export gateway reflects the importance of this region for 
North Korea‟s internationalization3.  
 
At last, we can quote the case of the Daean-Meccamidi (TM) joint-venture Company, an 
example of French-North Korean cooperation located on Daean and specialized in 
production of hydraulic power plant generator. TM has been created in 2004 in order to 
re-launch the national electricity production through a large program of small and 
medium hydraulic power plants covering the entire country. Authorities have estimated 
that this solution was better than the construction of new large power plan using oil for 
instance which needs to import oil, to update the aged local power grill and to damage 
the air environment. TM is now employing around 100 workers on the Daean Heavy 
Machine Complex‟s site and plans to produce 1 to 50 M Watts hydraulic power 
generators. They have the ambition to open a R&D centre in the coming years, the 
North Korean factory should start the exportations when the local hydraulic power 
plants program will be achieved. To proceed to the JV, the French partner has been 
agreed to bring its technology, management skill and cash, the North Korean side 
                                            
3
 Orascom Construction Industries, the Egyptian cement producer and construction group, announced
 a $115m investment in a cement plant in North Korea. The deal with state-owned Pyongyang Myo
ngdang Trading Corporation will see OCI take a 50 per cent stake in Sangwon Cement, which owns
 and operates the closest cement plant to Pyongyang. The increased capital will be used to modernis
e, rehabilitate and upgrade the plant‟s capacity to 3m tonnes a year. OCI‟s investment will also be u
sed to invest in ready-mix concrete, distribution, related mining operations and a dedicated hydroelec
tric power station near the plant (Source: Griggs and Fidler, 2007). 
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employees, building, mining concession and cash.  
 
This example shows that because DPRK‟s key-industries are located into NPC, it is 
easier to find there more solid and potential partners for JV than in the other North 
Korean provinces, and that at this early stage of North Korean economic opening it is 
more efficient to be geographically close to the authorities, situated in Pyongyang. 
 
2.2 Potentials for further European investments 
 
According to the North Korean regulation on foreign investments, foreigners have 
several options to open business. The most used is a joint venture company between an 
overseas partner and a local partner. Because of the local hard currency shortage, the 
North Korean part usually brings into the joint company, lands, buildings, vehicles and 
manpower. The foreign partner carries cash, machines, and technology or raw materials. 
In the case of strategic JV company, authorities can provide special guarantees or 
advantages like mining concession, tax reduction or favourable legislation. 
 
However and since the reform program launched in 2002, foreign investors are now 
able to be owner at 100 % of their investment, except for the land which remains the 
exclusive property of the State. Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the local 
administration and in order to get a better access to skilled manpower, commodities 
supply or more efficient distribution channel, it is still more efficient to choose the JV 
business model‟s option. 
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As this stage, an alternative business model could be selected by European investors 
worried by the cultural gap between them and their local partner. This other solution is a 
tripartite joint company associating a European firm, with South Korean and North 
Korean partners.  
 
 European side provides cash, technologies, strategic management skills; 
commercial debouches in Europe, and its flag. DPRK is willing to have cordial 
relationship with Europe in order to counterbalance the Tokyo-Washington axis 
and the too much influent China. As a result, European firms benefit of a quite 
welcome environment by Pyongyang and a better protection of their interest.  
 The South Korean side, associated with the European partner in a joint company 
under the UE flag, brings cash, technologies, its dynamism, commercial 
opportunities on South Korean market, and pragmatic management come from 
its cultural knowledge and its geographical proximity. 
 At last and like in regular JV business model, the North Korean side brings 
natural and human resources. 
 
If this formula is not without confer some concerns regarding political issue or 
communication between 3 parties, we can object that a European presence in this deal 
can moderate the inter-Korean passion being keep advantages of the Korean partners. 
After to have exanimate where to invest and how to invest, a last question is in which 
sector is it possible to invest in NPC?  
 
First of all, an industrial implantation into NPC must be focus on exportation to 
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European market or South Korean market (Chinese and Japanese markets in mid-term). 
Due to its low cost country characteristics and its easy access to various natural 
resources, steel and metallurgic activities, mechanic industries, automotive spares parts 
production (and in mid-term assembly), garments and shoes industries could be 
established there. Local manpower is ever qualified in these sectors and logistic system 
can support these activities. This is also facilitated by the proximity of Nampo to major 
load centres such as Dalian, Incheon, Busan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Osaka-Kobe, 
Yokohama, which connect to the world‟s busiest maritime lanes. Figure 4 represents 
93% of Nampo‟s direct maritime connections, together with the recent weight of those 
pivotal ports in terms of direct calls for container lines. It shows the already existing 
linkages and the high potential for Nampo to get connected to international markets via 
neighbouring ports (Ducruet and Roussin, 2007d; Ducruet et al., 2008; Ducruet, 2008b).  
 
Secondly and as we previously explained, demand has started to grow up into NPC‟s 
area, with around 20 % of the households earning more than 100 EUR per month. This 
population is composed of high ranking people in the administration or army,  
specialists (engineers in IT, mining or construction industries, translators…),  
companies managers and of various traders and businessmen who launched their own 
business (restaurants, transportation) or who are importing goods from overseas (mainly 
China). Largely represented on Pyongyang and also on Nampo, this population is 
demanding better services (taxi, banking, gas stations), improved public services 
(transport, waste treatment, water treatment and supply) understanding the idea that 
should be paid, and start to have a positive impact on construction and logistic 
industries. On all these sectors, European expertise is strong, world well-know and will 
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not suffer of the local American or Japanese competitions like the Chinese firms are 
now using DPRK to be even more competitive.    
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
To invest in DPRK is a bet, a risky adventure seen from Europe, but from a Northeast 
Asian perspective it is a new frontier of business development, illustrated by the intense 
movement of Chinese companies in North Korea (around 130 companies have activities 
there), and the proactive involvement South Korean companies and authorities in the 
development of Gaeseong industrial complex and Geumgang Mountain tour. As a result, 
European firms should have a more rational vision of North Korea and see all the 
advantages that they can take from this country ready to open economic cooperation 
with Europe: low-cost and relatively well educated manpower, large panel of natural 
resources, and strategic location between South Korea, Japan, Eastern Russia and China. 
The purpose of this paper has been to show that nowadays and for European interests, 
the Nampo-Pyongyang Corridor offers the best alternative between risk and safety, 
compare to other areas in North Korea. However, we can not forget that European 
Commission has opened FTA negotiations with South Korea and if we refer to the 
Korean-USA FTA case, the question of nationality of goods produced in Gaeseong 
Industrial Complex (GIC) will be put on the table. If European Union is agreed to 
include GIC in the FTA agreement, Gaeseong area could also become an interesting 
target for European investors focus on exportations, but with Damocles sword of any 
cooling in the inter-Korean dialogue process. 
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Table 1: Overview of economic activities in main economic areas of North Korea 
 Traditional industries Recent industries Potential industries Natural resources 
Pyongyang – 
Nampo 
Machinery, steel, electric, 
electronic, shipbuilding, 
cement, fertilizer, textile, 
clothing 
Glass, chemicals,  
construction materials, 
automotive 
Precision chemical, food and 
beverage, plastic and rubber, 
automotive spare parts and 
assembly 
Coal, gold, iron ore, silver, 
zinc 
Wonsan – 
Hamheung 
Chemical, machinery, non-
steel metal, cement, 
shipbuilding 
- 
Automobile, steel, non-ferrous 
metal, petrochemical, plastic 
and rubber, precision 
chemicals, chemical fertilizer, 
food and beverage, clothing, 
glass 
Tungsten, zinc 
Sinuiju 
Machinery, metal, chemical, 
textile, paper, pulp 
Sinuiju SAR (2002) 
Precision chemicals, plastic 
and rubber, clothing, food and 
beverage, wood, glass 
- 
Rajin – 
Seonbong 
Non-steel metal, 
petrochemical, coal 
Construction, logistics, real 
estate, retailing, tourism, 
transport [Rajin-Seonbong 
Free-Trade Zone,  1991] 
Wood, paper, pulp Uranium, coal 
Gaeseong – 
Haeju 
Cement, fertilizer, textile, 
agriculture, marine products 
Manufacturing [Gaeseong 
Industrial Park, 2004] 
Electric, electronics, clothing, 
food and beverage 
Graphite, molybdenum 
Cheongjin – 
Gimchaek 
Steel, metal, machinery, 
automobile, shipbuilding, 
equipollent, rubber 
- 
Non-ferrous metal, electric 
products 
Coal, cobalt, copper, 
graphite, iron ore, lead, 
magnesite, nickel 
Sources: compiled from Lee (2001) and various sources 
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Table 2: Benchmarking main economic areas of North Korea 
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Openness 3 2 3 3 1 12 
Development potential 3 2 3 2 1 11 
Labour quality / quantity 3 2 2 1 2 10 
Social Overhead Capital 3 2 2 1 2 10 
Market 3 2 2 1 2 10 
Landward linkages 2 2 3 2 1 10 
Industrial base 3 3 2 1 1 9 
Land 2 2 1 1 2 8 
Agglomeration effect 3 2 1 1 1 8 
Raw material 1 2 1 2 1 7 
Total 26 21 20 15 14  
Sources: adapted from Kim, 2000 and Lee, 2001 
 
Table 3: Estimated modal split in 1989 and 2005 
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1989 73.8 18.3 7.9 0.0 
2005 70.0 17.0 10.0 3.0 
Sources: Tsuji, 2000; Roussin and Ducruet, 2006 
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Figure 1: The North Korean transport system and truck accessibility of main cities 
 
Sources: SERIC COREE, 2005; Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements 
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Figure 2: Evolution of traffics at Nampo port, 1985-2005 
 
Sources: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Figure 3: Overview of the Nampo-Pyongyang corridor 
 
Sources: authors 
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Figure 4: Direct maritime linkages of Nampo port 
 
Sources: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit ; Containerisation International 
 
